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Abstract 
Developments in the area of ‘precision agriculture’ are creating new data points (about flows, 
soils, pests, climate) that agricultural technology providers ‘grab,’ aggregate, compute, and/or 
sell. Food producers now churn out food and, increasingly, data.  ‘Land grabs’ on the horizon 
in the global south are bound up with the dynamics of data production and grabbing, although 
researchers have not, as yet, revealed enough about the people and projects caught up in this 
new arena.  Against this backdrop, this paper examines some of the key issues taking shape, 
while highlighting new frontiers for research and introducing a concept of ‘data sovereignty,’ 
which food sovereignty practitioners (and others) need to consider.   
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Land grab / data grab 
 
Technology innovations will dramatically reshape how we produce and manage 
food in select markets [...] Some of these technologies could be game-changing 
for food systems, contributing to radically new approaches along the agricultural 
value chain and beyond. For example, CRISPR technology could reinvent seeds, 
big data and ICT could allow for more efficient and climate-smart farming 
practices, robotics could increase efficiencies in harvest and processing, sensors 
could reduce waste dramatically in transportation, artificial intelligence could 
revolutionize retail models, and personalized nutrition could reshape consumers’ 
preferences and behaviours. 
     -- World Economic Forum (2017, 21) 
 
1. Introduction 
It is almost a cliché to suggest we are living through a data revolution; that social media, self-
driving cars, robots and the like are altering our lives in dramatic ways. Yet considerable 
action today does point toward far-reaching changes in many spheres of social and economic 
life. As the above epigraph notes, food production is by no means immune to all this. In fact, 
on some farms today there are already ‘robot farmers’ (milking cows, for example), self-
driving factors (guided by satellite to improve fuel efficiency), and various other practices 
widely referred to as constitutive of a so-called ‘precision agriculture’ (PA) (among other 
things, leading to measures of yield per square metre). These types of developments use 
complex algorithms, lines of software code, proliferating sensors, and numerous 
computational models to generate, ‘crunch,’ build on, and roll-out data about human 
agricultural practices, the lives of animals, and the biophysical qualities of land. Sent to the 
‘cloud’ and then stored and manipulated in data farms (in essence, warehouses storing data on 
computer servers), this new source of information about food production excites 
commentators and observers of food production systems – and even leads some to anticipate 
that precision agriculture and ‘big data’ will ‘be the driver of the next revolution in 
agriculture’ (Pineda 2016).  
 
In this paper, my aim is to critically assess these developments with a view to probing what it 
means for a world increasingly open to (or, at least, familiar with) the core precepts of ‘food 
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sovereignty’ (e.g. see Wittman, Desmarais and Wiebe 2010). I locate the emergence of 
practices regarding PA against the background of a broader set of processes generating what 
numerous critical scholars in the area of agrarian studies refer to as a global ‘land grab’ (e.g. 
see Zoomers 2010; McMichael 2012). One element underpinning the land grab is the 
changing relationship between approaches to food production and land use in the global north 
(and the export-oriented sub-sector of a bifurcated global south [Akram-Lodhi 2007]), and 
the forms of food production and land use familiar to the 2.5 billion people still involved in 
farming in the global south. Neatly (if crudely) summed up by the World Bank (2007) as a 
matter of closing a growing ‘yield gap’ between capital-intensive and small-scale food 
production systems, this relationship is not just about differences in yields; rather, today it is 
also about the nature of backward and forward linkages to technology providers and the 
technology sector’s emerging stake in seeing markets for their services grow, which pivots in 
large part on global south-food producers ‘adopting’ (read: purchasing) goods and services 
associated with PA in the coming years. In turn, these dynamics of the land grab need to be 
understood in relation to the ‘spaces of early adoption’ in the global north where, as I intend 
to demonstrate, a contested ‘data grab’ has become a new battleground over the future of 
farming. The peril is obvious: the data grab will amplify the global land grab. However, at 
least one obstacle is the possibility that notions of food sovereignty might embrace and 
develop what I tentatively refer to as ‘data sovereignty’ – a possibility I introduce and discuss 
in the Conclusion.  
 
2. The data grab  
The proliferation of internet-enabled devices (desktops, laptops, Smartphones, etc.) and 
enormous demand for related services (web sites, email, social media, etc.) provided by firms 
such as Google, Facebook, and Twitter has created an entirely new phenomenon: ‘data 
grabbing.’ In essence, this refers to the practice of ‘tech’ (and increasingly today, many other) 
firms gathering detailed information about their customers – what users search for, click on, 
like or favourite, share with others – which they can analyze with a view to building detailed 
user profiles. Subsequently, these firms can sell these data to advertisers (the ads that seem to 
remember what products we have searched for reflect precisely this activity taking place; 
based on what we do online, numerous other less visible processes are also taking place). 
Alternatively, firms can establish large datasets about their users which become intellectual 
assets that increase their market value and attract buyout bids from other firms. The recent 
purchase by Microsoft of the social networking firm LinkedIn for $26.2 billion is a prominent 
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case in point: Microsoft wanted intellectual property and knowledge of social media, but also 
the capacity to learn from and use LinkedIn’s dataset of 430 million users (Hern & 
Kasperkevic 2016).  
 
In one sense, because customers agree to use these type of services for free, in exchange for 
data about their lives being collected and analyzed, there is a tacit understanding that ‘free’ 
use occurs precisely because data is collated and then conceivably sold. There is, therefore, a 
case to be made that users are simply involved in a straightforward form of exchange: they 
get to use the latest software and stay in touch with others in return for giving up a degree of 
their privacy to firms that consistently proclaim their innocence – or, if not, at least their 
commitment to using customer information with a view to improving their services or 
delivering ‘better’ or ‘more relevant’ advertisements. However, insofar as the activities of all 
customers in networks of social relations generate data with an exchange value greater than 
the sum of its individual parts, but yet never receive their share of that value, there is a ‘grab’ 
taking place: a form of dispossession. Moreover, the notion that users are customers and 
therefore consumers no longer entirely holds true today because, in their daily activities and 
practices online, consumers actively take part, suggest refinements to the way software 
operates, and indeed create the data points that algorithmic analysts can study and alter to 
improve the quality and marketability of services. Consumers produce the services they 
enjoy, as well as the data their use throws up for analysis. In other words, today’s customers 
are ‘prosumers’ (Toffler 1980).  
 
Following Ettlinger (2017), I argue for recognizing that the proliferation of data-grabbing 
services creates ‘dispossessed prosumers’ – billions of dispersed subjects actively, yet mostly 
unconsciously, enrolled in an ongoing and expanding ‘data grab’ worth hundreds of billions 
of dollars and creating numerous opportunities for accumulation, which therefore further 
fuels the expansion of a basket or suite of services that repeat the process, generating 
additional data and dispossession (consider only the unending roll out of new ‘apps’ and 
‘plug-ins,’ many of them given away for ‘free’). The process does not end here. Firms grab 
data and add value (by aggregating, packaging); but algorithms then use those data to target 
consumers with ads and services, thereby shaping subjectivities. The algorithmic moment, 
occurring out of sight in dispersed computer servers on the cloud, relies on dispossession but 
then actively works to alter society in ways we are only slowly beginning to understand.  
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Many elements of this overall process of technological development and the expansion of 
dispossessed prosumption have been charted and critiqued all across the social sciences (as 
well as beyond in civil society, the media, etc) (for an overview, see boyd & Crawford 2012; 
also Kitchin 2014). For the most part, however, it is activity of (what we might refer to as) an 
urban slant that tends to attract the most attention. At issue, for instance, is the new structure 
of labour markets ‘disrupted’ by firms such as Uber and Lyft; the prospect of driverless cars 
and trucks, thereby potentially displacing workers; the emergence of entirely new 
crowdsourcing mechanisms to outsource (often quite advanced forms of) white collar work; 
and the expansion of ‘gig economy’ jobs such as running errands, cleaning houses, walking 
dogs, and so on. In a similar vein, a large literature has focused on the development of new 
technologies seeking to adjust social life in the city: sensors, mapping software, and ‘urban 
dashboards’ enable urban governance to assume a decidedly tech-intensive guise as the fluxes 
and flows of traffic lights or energy use prompt decision-makers to adjust what they spend, or 
how they distribute resources (e.g. see Kitchin 2011, 2015; Kitchin, Maalsen and McArdle 
2016). The coded city – a city monitored and tweaked by algorithms and software analysts, 
even in distant locations – comes into view here; undoubtedly a neoliberalizing city that 
measures, evaluates, and examines social life through the lens of neoclassical economics and 
judges efficiency and effectiveness in terms of dollars spent or invested (Dierwechter 2013; 
Pollio 2016). For tech firms, indeed, this is an urban form that invites competition and 
encourages, albeit unevenly, ‘disruptive’ practices (‘disrupted’ as in the sense that relatively 
stable and regulated markets are altered by the arrival of new services, which also alter the 
lives of urban dwellers, with mixed results). So-called ‘tech summits’ and various forms of 
‘open innovation’ (Ettlinger 2017) also encourage (at times, unpaid) entrepreneurial activity 
from individuals and firms alike.  
 
Contemporary cities constituted by urban dwellers staring down at their Smartphones when 
out and about, or using one of many internet-enabled devices at home, create enormous (as-
yet-unimagined) potential markets for the tech sector. Yet, these new markets remain in their 
gestational phase, suggesting uncertainty about the societal implications of these 
technological developments. Taking stock of what has been taking place, some see scope in 
the new patterns of prosumer-deviced-interconnectivity for more equitable distributions of 
resources (a smart city knows what’s needed where, or so the story goes); more effective 
governance mechanisms (via citizen participation, for example); and greater levels of overall 
well-being (in a city where information is ‘on tap’). Yet, for many others, prosumption-driven 
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services and devices not only mean dispossession, but also engender discriminatory 
categorisation, surveillance, intrusion, the loss of privacy, and deepening dependence on 
(often, offshore) providers accumulating profits from dispersed economies globally (and in 
cases of data offshoring, they are generating debates about the possible need for data 
protectionism). 
 
It should come as no surprise that the same processes and practices applying to urban spaces 
are getting worked out in the agricultural sector. As is widely noted by scholars in agrarian 
studies (see especially Weis 2007; also Moore 2010), agricultural producers already depend 
heavily on the application of inputs, such as (patented) seeds and agri-chemicals. More 
recently and reflecting the pace of technological development beyond agriculture, 
transnational corporations such as Monsanto and John Deere have created new PA products 
that pivot on the use of devices, sensors, and data flows (Bronson and Knezevic 2016). The 
input ‘treadmill’ (Weis 2007) is becoming more digital, cloud-based, and device-laden. It is 
conceivable, as some government reports suggest (e.g. see Teagasc 2016; Schrijver 2016), 
that PA will address purported food production shortfalls as the world moves toward a 
population of nine billion. But alongside its expansion, and indeed an essential component 
thereof, this new ‘data revolution’ in agriculture holds out the possibility of altering food 
production systems and agrarian relations more generally in potentially profound ways. In the 
following discussion, then, I consider two elements of this scene. The first is about the push 
for PA in the ‘spaces of early adoption’ in the global north, which I will consider in the next 
section of the paper. The second concerns the push into the global south, to which I then turn. 
Although action in these arenas overlaps, it makes sense to treat them separately because, as I 
want to demonstrate, the potential impacts differ qualitatively. 
 
3. Precision agriculture and the data grab in the spaces of early adoption 
If there is a data grab in global north agriculture it is largely because farmers embracing PA 
have purchased new technologies that monitor, map, and manage farm activities, while also 
generating data for service providers to analyze and take to market. PA refers to digital 
techniques that monitor and optimise production processes by advising farmers and/or 
remotely adjusting machinery to optimally apply fertiliser or chemicals to the land and feed 
to animals, thereby conceivably increasing yields and outputs and improving the efficiency 
and effectiveness of inputs (Schrijver 2016). As Lane Arthur, Director of Digital Solutions in 
John Deere's Intelligent Solutions Group (ISG) puts it:  
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Precision agriculture is about getting more from each decision, each job that goes 
into growing the food we eat. The foundation of that is highly automated farming 
machines guided by software, GPS technology and satellites. With sub-inch 
accuracy, farmers control the precise placement of seeds and chemicals. They 
spray precisely the right amount of fertilizer and harvest precisely. Sensors and 
IoT [Internet of Things] make those things possible (quoted in Puri 2016). 
 
Although a detailed review of the literature on farm level profits reports mixed results 
(Schimmelpfennig 2016a), a vibrant market exists for PA packages and concomitant sensors, 
devices, software, and data flows with the unifying vision that systems will yield is ‘more 
agricultural output with less input’ (Schrijver, 2016, 30). 
 
In the dairy sector, for example, the expansion of so-called ‘precision milking’ and feeding 
robots has gathered pace in recent years (Gedders & Adamchuk 2010). Thus, as noted in a 
Scientific Foresight Study for the European Parliamentary Research Service (Schrijver 2016, 
30-31), the: 
 
Netherlands, Germany and France are currently leading the shift towards 
automatic milking. Some 90% of new equipment installations in Sweden and 
Finland, and 50% in Germany include robotic farming. Half of the dairy herds in 
north-western Europe will be milked by robots in 2025.  
 
Using new inputs such as ‘[a]utomatic milk feeders for calves [and] online analysis of milk 
composition, including cell counts (an important index of hygienic condition), fat, protein, 
and lactose’ (Gedders & Adamchuk 2010, 830), dairy farmers expect to see milk yields 
increase from an EU average of 6,915kg milk per cow to as much as 12,000kg, as has been 
achieved in some demonstration farms (Schrijver 2016, 31).  
 
Another prominent PA component is auto-steering combines and tractors using guidance 
systems – ‘adopted on 45 to 55 percent of planted acres for several major crops between 2010 
and 2013’ (Schimmelpfennig 2016b) – that claim to minimize over- and under-application of 
chemicals, aim to improve seeding, and conceivably reduce operator fatigue. Then there is 
variable-rate application technology (VRT), which introduces methods of assessing ‘the 
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spatial variability of farm parameters related to practices such as tillage, seeding, weeding, 
fertilization, herbicide & pesticide application and harvesting’ (European Commission 2015a, 
71-72). Not yet used to the same extent as guidance systems, VRT was used on only 12% of 
US corn farms smaller than 600 acres in 2010, but yet 40% of farms over 3,000 acres 
(Schimmelpfennig 2016a, 12). PA encourages economies of scale. Finally, there are PA 
components such as GPS (Global Positioning Systems) soil and yield mapping; drone 
mapping; and detailed forms of climate data, a factor leading to Monsanto’s purchase of The 
Climate Corp., a climate data science company, for $930 million in 2013 (Bennett 2017). 
 
In these guises, PA feeds into diverse Farm Management Information Systems (FMIS) – 
systems for ‘collecting, processing, storing, and disseminating [the data] needed to carry out a 
farm’s operations and functions [and including] specific farmer-oriented designs, dedicated 
user interfaces, automated data processing functions, expert knowledge and user preferences, 
standardized data communication and scalability’ (Fountas et al 2015, 41) – and other 
decision support systems (DSS) found across global north agriculture. PA also plugs into 
data-producing traceability architectures, reflecting in Europe a growing need for ‘farmers to 
demonstrate compliance to the auditing authorities [which thereby increases] the need to 
implement FMIS aided by automated data collection’ (48). Partly at issue here is what 
scholars in the area of rural studies (e.g. see Hinchliffe et al 2013) refer to as ‘biosecurity;’ 
that is, the need for farmers to track and trace their outputs and thereby comply with food 
safety rules such as Europe’s General Food Law Regulation (EC) 178/2002 (as well as 
supermarket-driven governance mechanisms). In theory, at least, PA facilitates and reduces 
the cost of ‘tracking, tracing and documenting’ (Schrijver 2016, 31). The underlying notion is 
that greater digitised scrutiny of production systems via PA will boost food safety. On-farm 
sensors, for example:  
 
...can be used to detect naturally occurring toxins commonly known as 
mycotoxins in grains, fruits, vegetables, and dangerous pathogens that threaten 
our food supply. More importantly, these sensors can be used to detect the 
presence of pathogens or other dangerous agents in foods in less disruptive, more 
efficient and less costly ways than current sampling methods (European 
Commission 2015a, 72).  
 
9 
 
Beyond biosecurity, PA is promoted by governments and providers as a way to improve feed 
conversion efficiency. Assumptions that human diets will remain and even become more 
meat-rich, which pivots on converting plant biomass into animal protein, puts pressure on 
agricultural systems to convert feed more effectively. Against the backdrop of projections that 
livestock production in 2050 will require an additional 553 million tonnes of grain each year 
(IAASTD 2009; cited in European Commission 2015b, 52), PA enters into the frame because 
it holds out the promise of monitoring the lives of animals in more analytical ways, thereby 
enabling farmers to cater feed operations and minimize waste (130). At issue is 
‘optimisation’:  
 
While advances in agriculture have often resulted from innovations on single 
components (such as breeding, chemical inputs, irrigation technologies), future 
solutions are expected to arise from the optimisation of systems i.e. optimisation 
of the interplay between their components (European Commission 2015c, 4).  
 
The new ‘technological fix’ to agriculture’s persistent and ‘accelerating biophysical 
contradictions’ (Weis 2010) goes beyond finding new and better chemical inputs by focusing 
on analyses of on-farm interactions; on the monitoring, modelling, and management of data 
flows from individual animals, farms as a whole, and system-wide practices.   
 
Data: ‘the new cash crop’ 
Data is a crucial input and output of PA. Robotic milking, for example, ‘generates about 120 
variables per cow per day such as: movements, feed being distributed, milk being produced, 
quality of milk, temperature, coughs and other cattle diseases…’ (Schrijver 2016, 31). And 
there are the various types of farm machinery in use today, such as the ‘Jaguar Forage 
Harvester made by Claas of America in Sarpy County [which] measures more than 40 
parameters as owners operate the machine; the company’s Lexion combine tracks and records 
more than 70’ (Epley 2015). The following description of John Deere’s mechanisms shed 
further light on the sort of data flows at issue in PA: 
 
Data from the sensors on the planter is fed to a wireless data server under the seat 
of the tractor. It pushes the data to the cloud every five seconds. John Deere has 
its own data centers, but the company also works with public cloud providers 
such as Amazon Web Services (AWS). Communication with the planter is 
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bidirectional. A seed rep might divide a field into zones based on elevation and 
soil type. He prepares a ‘seed prescription’ for the field—similar to a medical 
prescription. This defines what seeds should be planted and at what spacing on 
the field. The planting instructions are sent directly to the John Deere planter, 
which changes the seed planting accordingly. It’s highly automated (Puri 2016). 
 
Thus, even if there are yield gains – more cereals per hectare; more milk per cow – farmers 
buying PA inputs from Agricultural Technology Providers (ATPs) are also producing data, 
which ATPs currently are best positioned to collect, store, analyze, and sell in bundles or 
packages that feed into the algorithms of disparate firms involved in agriculture, or not. Data 
are, in fact, at least for some in the sector, ‘the new cash crop’ (Tatge 2016) because, once 
they have been aggregated, they have value for seed and chemical firms, agronomists, co-
operatives, farm insurance providers, and machinery firms. Insofar as farmers sign (or click 
‘accept’ on) end-user license agreements and thereby agree that ATPs can collect their data – 
quite like those who agree to hand over data in return for using email or social media services 
– PA facilitates the conversion of farmers into ‘dispossessed prosumers.’ For some observers, 
then, too many farmers continue to be unaware ‘of all the ways in which a company intends 
to use their farm data’ (Clark 2016). 
 
By no means does the story end here. There have been debates about data stewardship (i.e. 
data ownership, security/protection, and privacy) (see Archer & Delgadillo 2016) within the 
agricultural sector and, in response, the American Farm Bureau has sought to create 
guidelines regarding data access, control, and information disclosure for ATPs (Epley 2015). 
Working with ATPs such as Dow AgroSciences LLC, DuPont Pioneer, John Deere, 
Monsanto, and various farmers’ institutions, the Farm Bureau has recently produced ‘data 
principles,’ an ‘Ag Data Transparency Evaluator,’ and a new interface called the ADAPT 
Toolkit, which  ‘will allow each equipment manufacturer to keep its own proprietary software 
and technology in the cab and monitor, but will allow participating companies to “export to” 
and “import from” a common, open-source ADAPT file format’ (Grassi 2017; also see Farm 
Bureau 2017). As Lane Arthur from John Deere suggests:  
 
Data is extremely valuable. John Deere believes farmers should control the data 
generated by their operations. This involves deciding who it should be shared 
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with. For example, a farmer could decide to share data from one field or only 
share data from one planting season with a partner (Puri 2016).  
 
These initiatives reflect awareness that ATPs are well-positioned to create valuable datasets 
without sharing revenues with farmers, but that they need to be seen to do so in a way that 
builds trust with farmers. As a Scientific Foresight Study for the European Parliament states: 
‘Making farmers the owners of their data and providing opportunities to control the flow of 
their data to stakeholders should help build trust with farmers for exchanging data and harvest 
the fruits of the analysis of big data’ (Schrijver 2016, 9). The catch-all term here is ‘open’ or 
‘transparent’ data; in the EU an Open Data Directive and at G8 level an Open Data Charter 
(see Teagasc 2016, 41; my emphases) are indications of efforts to streamline and standardise 
‘data stewardship.’ Yet, even if agricultural data are ‘open,’ farmers are not necessarily 
equipped to conduct the right sort of analysis that can add any value: a series of data points is 
one thing, but knowing how to analyze or create new models (and having the computing 
power and time to do so) is another thing entirely. Moreover, data about one farm operation 
have only limited value as compared to when data about numerous farms is aggregated (e.g. 
see Ellixson and Griffin 2017). As Jiménez et al (2016) point out, ‘the value of information 
obtained from farmers’ experiences and controlled experiments is enhanced [by] modern data 
mining techniques [that] can establish relationships and associations between observations 
from multiple sources, which farmers can use to improve their crop husbandry’ (14; my 
emphasis). Thus, what ATPs see before them is the possible emergence of a landscape in 
which farmers submit data, even via open toolkits, that only the largest firms will be able to 
use effectively. In the case of Monsanto’s subsidiary The Climate Corp, for example, the 
machine learning capabilities of its systems (algorithm-based software which learns from its 
own mistakes) can scan images taken from fields to ‘quickly process the disease present in 
the image and give the grower the proper diagnosis of the pathogen’ (Bennett 2017); but this 
is about machine learning capabilities that will be massively improved once its platform is 
connected to food production on 300 to 400 million acres, rather than its current 100 million 
acres (Plume 2016). 
 
PA’s other emerging tensions  
If the data question is one emerging area of dispute regarding PA, there are some notable 
others. One is the possibility that PA will alter the overall market for agricultural inputs, with 
uncertain consequences for actors upstream of the farm. At issue is that PA differs from the 
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markets for agricultural chemicals and farm machinery insofar as the barriers to entry for 
some products are much smaller, which means there is scope for small-scale suppliers to 
capture market share from the sector’s corporate giants. For example, farmers with the right 
skills and/or determination (and without having to write code) can purchase and operate 
relatively cheap equipment such as drones fitted with cameras and sensors. Indeed, some 
guidance systems on farm machinery have been developed by small firms such as Sixty-5 
Technologies in Belfast – in this case, a single-band receiver on the roof of a tractor 
(McCullough 2016). In celebratory tones, therefore, some commentators suggest the data 
revolution, including new high quality and (for Europeans, free) satellite imagery, is driving 
down costs so much that the ‘sky is the limit for agricultural technology’ (Tasker 2016). 
 
Another emerging debate concerns the link between farmers, PA, buyers, markets and prices. 
Supermarkets exert pressure on food producers to upgrade equipment merely to remain 
within the supply chain. But the costs of moving into PA are ‘sunk costs’ and are not 
recoverable – unlike farm machinery, for example, they is a small resale market for many PA 
inputs (Schimmelpfennig 2016, 13) – hence farmers absorb start-up costs at risk they will not 
see the expected benefits. Even if PA does deliver gains, they may be offset in the long run if 
improved yields do indeed deliver higher output but conceivably also lower output prices. 
Either way, the growth of PA engenders and deepens a digital divide between the most 
capital-intensive farms and those unable or unwilling to embrace contemporary technologies. 
Its adoption might therefore give further impetus to the growth of larger farm holdings – a 
process already well developed in the US and now a growing feature of European agriculture, 
given an annual rate of decline in the number of farms of 3.7% between 2005 and 2013 
(Schrijver 2016, 6). In effect, PA complicates concepts of rurality constituted by small-scale 
farmers, which remain bound up with popular notions of national identity across Europe and 
in the US. Moreover, the potential significance of PA cannot be understated precisely because 
of the contested nature of ‘post-productivist’ rural spaces today; spaces, that is, that are 
projected in some places (especially Europe) to remain a public good accessible to urban 
dwellers but yet also central to a ramped-up export-oriented production complex targeting 
increased animal protein consumption in Asian markets. A central attraction of PA in Europe 
is its promise to boost output and enable farmers to target export markets, while also enabling 
an overall decline in the area of farmed land over the next decades. In play here, therefore, is 
the role of PA in altering the emerging relationship between global north agriculture and food 
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production in the global south, as demonstrated in the following brief discussion of PA in 
Ireland’s export-oriented agricultural sector. 
 
‘Data is the new soil’: PA, export agriculture, and the Irish ‘ag-tech’ model   
The Irish government has aggressively encouraged dairy and livestock exports as a 
component of its attempted fix of a debt- and crisis-ridden economy now undergoing a period 
of ‘recovery’ amid a broader structural adjustment (or, as it is referred to in Ireland, an 
‘austerity’) programme. Exports are absolutely central to the fate of dairy and livestock 
producers in Ireland, many of whom are not only banking on continued access to the global 
marketplace but growing protein consumption in Asia.  
 
In alignment with this export push, the Irish government views its nascent ‘ag-tech’ sector as 
key players in a rising global market for PA-related inputs. As noted by Teagasc (the Irish 
national government’s body for research, advisory and training services to the agriculture and 
food industry) in a flagship report, Technology Foresight 2035:  
 
Innovative Irish companies are already serving domestic farmers and farmers 
around the world with a range of technologically advanced products and services, 
including data-driven services that help farmers improve profitability based on 
real-time advice on animal health and nutrition […] Ireland is a technology hub 
of choice for the strategic business activities of eight of the top ten global ICT 
companies and we also have a growing indigenous digital technology sector with 
sales of over €2bn per annum. Many of these companies are already working with 
Teagasc and its partners to develop next generation technologies and systems to 
improve productivity and reduce the environmental impact for agri-food 
producers. Their ultimate goal is to export these systems and services to rapidly 
growing markets around the world… (Teagasc 2016, 24; emphasis added). 
 
Accordingly, if Ireland is to become a ‘global leader,’ if it is going to ‘take global leadership,’ 
the Teagasc report suggests ‘there is a need to bring these players around the table to develop 
a national strategy for an export-oriented agri-digital industry’ (24). Not only will Irish 
farmers need to play their part – ‘New technologies and farming systems will only contribute 
adequately to a globally sustainable Irish agri-food and bioeconomy sector if adoption rates 
[among Irish farmers] are improved’ (26; my emphasis) – but this will be an export push in 
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which the state will play a prominent role (much like the ‘strategic coupling’ which Asia 
states use as a way to pair workers with manufacturing transnational corporations and their 
global production networks [e.g. see Coe et al 2004; Lee, Heo and Kim 2014]).  
 
A crucial consideration here is the Irish state’s extant pro-enterprise stance, which it has 
cultivated over the last twenty years in particular (e.g. Breathnach 2010), and which it uses to 
extend venture funding (a subsidy, in all but name) via Enterprise Ireland (the state’s agency 
seeking to support Irish businesses) to Irish PA firms. A case in point is GrassOmeter, an 
Irish-designed device used to measure grass growth. And indeed, as one of its designers 
noted, at issue in this field of investment is not so much the devices and their value to users 
but rather the possibilities they open up for data analysis:   
 
Once you are gathering data, that data has got value for fertiliser companies and 
seed firms so there is a bigger interest there than just the individual farmer […] 
Data is the new soil: it's as important for the farm of the future as the tractor is 
today. As technology progresses, you are able to measure things and manage 
things in ways that you couldn't do before. Increasingly that data is going to be as 
important as the crops that are harvested (Steve Lock, quoted in Independent 
2015; emphasis added). 
 
The presence of the Irish state and its ag-tech firms in the field of PA is bound up with efforts 
to locate the Irish economy as a supplier of PA inputs to the global market and as an analyzer 
of the data. In this regard it is worth noting that Irish ‘data farms’ are already among the 
largest and most efficient in the world, which has proved useful in attracting some of the tech 
sector’s largest firms to establish European headquarters there (a low corporation tax rate has 
also helped). In courting these firms via the Irish Development Authority, the Irish state’s 
vehicle for attracting inward investment, the country has created a pool of talent and expertise 
in the technology sector, a factor which has fed into the growth of Irish ag-tech firms. One 
such firm, Keenan, runs InTouch, a ‘cloud platform which enables real-time access to on-
farm and supply chain data for the management of animal performance, health and nutrition’ 
(Teagasc 2016, 42). InTouch collects data from sensors on ‘over 3000 farms across the world’ 
– nutritionists interpret the data in Ireland and then give advice to farmers, thereby advising 
them to ‘make better feed and nutrition decisions in the management of their animals, so as to 
drive performance and profitability.’  
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Thus, in one model of Ireland’s future, PA firms transfer data collected in Sub-Saharan Africa 
or Asia and then process it in Ireland. By virtue of doing so, they learn not only about 
agricultural practice globally but also how overall procedures can be made into new 
intellectual property (and conceivably patented). In another model, Irish ag-tech firms 
develop new PA technologies that attract larger firms, leading to partnerships, strategic 
alliances, and conceivably buyouts (in this regard, it is revealing that US-based privately-held 
animal health company AllTech recently purchased Keenan in 2016 [Brennan 2016]). 
Ultimately, on the agenda for all of these actors is the globalization of PA and the prospect of 
taking part in the emerging data grab, which the Irish state and its PA firms view as a viable 
strategy for their future. From their vantage point, in a wealthy export-oriented country in the 
global north, one with a strong agricultural sector benefitting from persistent support from the 
EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (e.g. see Fraser 2011), Irish PA entrepreneurs, designers, 
and investors look out on the global south and see scope for growth. Opportunity knocks. It 
is, then, in the notion embedded within the PA story that ‘data is the new soil’ – that data can 
become a new cash crop; that the sky is the limit – that I suggest the global south really starts 
to come into view. As I have noted, there are dynamics about PA specific to the global north: 
issues of power, process, and profit projections among ATPs, which pivot on farm businesses 
embracing or becoming compelled into buying PA inputs. Some of these dynamics spill over 
into the global south. But the specificity of PA in the global south really seems to stand out 
with respect to processes associated with the land grab, as I now discuss. 
 
4. Land grab / data grab 
Talk of a ‘global land grab’ calls attention to the prospect of a shift, endorsed by the World 
Bank (2007), toward more capital-intensive agriculture and increases in average farm sizes in 
the global south. Driven by external agents, such as sovereign wealth funds (Zoomers 2010), 
‘national capital’ (e.g. see Byres 2016), and dramatic as well as more gradual acquisitions (or 
state-sanctioned expropriations), land grabs intersect with projections about rising demand 
for protein amidst growing affluence in Asia1 and the prospect of increased demand for 
biofuels (Vermeulen & Cotula 2010).  
                                                 
1 But only if governments globally continue to reject the possibility of limiting such demand, for 
example via forms of meat rationing, a dramatic intervention but one that would recognize the 
planetary limits to this type of dietary change (see Weis 2013) . 
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PA and elements of the data grab are bound to play a role in all this. As we should probably 
expect, PA services are already common in the ‘export-oriented sub-sector’ in the ‘bifurcated’ 
global south (Akram-Lodhi 2007). In Brazil’s soybean sector, for example, guidance systems 
and VRT are widely used (Silva, Ferraz Dias de Moraes, and Molin 2011). Such practices 
immediately raise questions about the way data is generated and used. There is the prospect 
of data moving offshore to be processed, aggregated, and sold in the US without Brazilian 
soybean producers receiving any share of the product. In this regard, Brazilian soybean 
farmers occupy a similar position to farmers in the US, although matters to do with the legal 
infrastructure might alter those dynamics: Brazil established a Civil Rights Framework for 
the Internet in 2014 (e.g. see Archer & Delgadillo 2016). Nevertheless, investment from the 
global north is occurring, such as US-based agricultural data firm AGDATA acquiring PRG 
Brazil AG in 2015, which signals corporate interest in expanding the frontiers of PA and 
pushing on with the data grab.   
 
Furthermore, in what Akram-Lodhi (2007) refers to as the peasant sub-sector, that is, on 
those pieces of land we might imagine is in the firing line of the land grab, PA is also 
becoming part of the scene. Some PA applications to highlight here are relatively low-tech 
and might therefore be considered as creating data-neutral dynamics: micro-dosing fertilizer 
in Niger, precision levelling in Uttar Pradesh, and devices such as GreenSeeker in Mexico 
(van Kark 2014).2 VRT, however, is a different entity. Consider that Raj Khosla, a plant 
scientist and PA specialist based in Colorado, has highlighted nitrogen variability on farms as 
small as 1.5 hectares: ‘Where yields were higher, plants were removing more nutrients. We've 
seen variability on less than a third of a hectare of land’ (quoted in van Kark 2014). The types 
of innovations developed in places such as Ireland – devices and services like the 
aforementioned GrassOmeter – are pertinent examples of how VRT might begin entering into 
the frame in the peasant sub-sector. Indeed, as noted by Mark Rosegrant, Director of the 
Environment and Production Technology Division at the International Food Policy Research 
Institute (IFPRI):  
 
                                                 
2 It is unclear whether guidance systems in farm machinery will make a big impact given their 
expense and focus on large farm sizes, although even here, with falling prices for components and 
new applications arriving on the market, guidance systems are by no means entirely off limits.  
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…using smaller scale sensors and machinery in places like India, South Africa, 
China, and after that, countries in Southeast Asia are already you're finding the 
uses of these kind of smaller-scale precision agriculture which boosts yield 
significantly, but also then reduces run-off of nitrogen, volatilization of that into 
greenhouse gases, as well, as well as reducing water use, which is essential 
(Rosegrant 2014).  
 
Given these sorts of developments, it makes sense to identify and examine interactions 
between the land and data grabs. Hitherto, however, the dynamics at work in the expansion of 
PA and specifically its relationship with ‘big data,’ the digital economy, and the data 
revolution have not received attention in debates about the emergence of a global land grab – 
although ‘big data’ has emerged in analyses of the ‘rush’ to write about it (e.g. see Zoomers, 
Gekker and Schafer 2016; also Oya 2013b).  
 
Yet, in Millar’s (2015) fascinating research on a ‘bio-ethanol plantation covering 40,000 
hectares of agricultural land in the rural north of Sierra Leone’ (6), one key dynamic is 
highlighted which connects fruitfully with the materials I have been grappling with in this 
paper. Specifically, Millar flags the importance to contemporary investors of land registers, 
surveys, and maps, as well as digital knowledge in the form of satellite imagery, GPS 
coordinates, and Geographic Information Systems (GIS). The company’s use of these 
materials and data flows, Millar finds, ‘contributed to the diffusion of corporate power over 
local land and people [by dissociating] information regarding land from the dynamic social 
contexts in which it is located [and thereby serving] to marginalize local people from the 
operation of power’ (15). Thus, whereas land grabs in the colonial period were 
cartographically-oriented to document altitude, the flow of rivers, the variability in soils, and 
the potential existence of mineral deposits (e.g. see Scott 1998), land grabs in the 21st century 
pivot on digital knowledge. Putting investment plans into place today – knowing where to go, 
what to expect to find there, what the lay of the land will be like, what constitutes the terrain 
– requires data (for example, for the simple purpose of using computer-aided design (CAD) 
software to build warehouses, offices, or model transportation or other flows of materials). 
Land grabbing needs data.  
 
A similar logic is at work in the geographical expansion of PA. At issue is a drive to acquire 
digital knowledge that can inform its roll-out, which will then generate scope to harvest new 
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data sources. As noted earlier, ATPs and PA providers are already learning extensively about 
global north spaces. As they try to achieve their ambitions of exporting services and devices 
to the global south – and before they can begin harvesting ‘the new crop’ of data therein – 
they need to acquire information and knowledge about those spaces. The expansion of PA in 
the global south hinges on (and targets) data. For example, for the designers, the innovators, 
or the venture capitalists in places such as Ireland and beyond, growing the market for PA 
inputs (raising the venture capital; making the right investments) means they need data on the 
places into which their products will exported. Satellite imagery does go some of the way 
here; however, the crucial ‘last mile’ when it comes to PA is the micro-scale details about 
soils, nutrients, watercourses, or climate. Whether via a freeware model or by leasing devices 
using micro-credit, with users (potentially, unwittingly) handing over data about their land, 
the expansionist logics of PA demand that ATPs accumulate additional layers of 
topographical, topological (flows inward and outward; links, connections, and relations with 
suppliers and buyers, markets and government), and even social data (farmer practices, rates 
of technology adoption, customer feedback). If the globalization of PA is to occur, and if 
users in the global south are to become the next wave of customers, data must flow.  
 
In short, the land grab targets land (or water [Mehta, Veldwisch and Franco 2012]); but the 
land itself (its shape, dimensions, and topography) is only an initial block of data for ATPs 
and PA product developers. From the perspective of ATPs, the promise of the land grab is not 
only that new capitalist farmers might emerge and begin purchasing inputs, but also that the 
micro-scale qualities of their land and lives potentially will be fed into the data analytics 
infrastructures run by these firms (or aggregated, packaged, and sold on by them). ATPs stand 
to piece together a rich (and valuable) cartography and database from which new 
understandings of soil variability, nitrogen, and climate might emerge (conceivably, forms of 
knowledge they will be able to patent).   
 
None of this should appear fanciful. The logics at work are quite clearly evident. There is 
already pressure on producers globally to comply with food safety standards, which compels 
farmers to adopt (at least basic elements of) PA architectures as a way to remain in the supply 
chain (e.g. see Knox, Kay and Weatherhead 2012). The ‘efficiency’ gains and apparent 
biosecurity merits of PA approaches spill over and get pushed into distant locales, thereby 
producing additional pressure on food producers to ‘modernize’ and comply with standards 
set in distant territories, or exit the market. In doing so, these producers are already 
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generating data and therefore the initial conditions for new rounds of the data grab. Then 
there is the need among ATPs to expand their markets. The suppliers of PA inputs, like the 
suppliers of other agricultural inputs, are always under pressure from their shareholders to 
strategize and find new outlets where the greatest scope for growth exists. And alongside this 
pressure there is the matter of the tech sector’s momentum to consider here. For example, 
developments such as so-called ‘machine learning’ aim to identify soils, pests, or determine 
the ‘correct’ application of chemicals, but these approaches will only succeed if the 
algorithms are fed data. In turn, the ‘crunching’ – the analysis, the twisting and crafting of 
algorithms – taking place off-farm (indeed potentially offshore, per the Irish model noted 
above), and not necessarily by data analytics firms in the agricultural sector, will generate 
scope for additional innovations, new applications, and devices. The land grab yields a data 
grab. Left to its own devices, the data grab simply exploits dispossessed prosumers but, in an 
as-yet poorly understood and complex manner, its beneficiaries demand that new data points 
and providers are created and then harvested. A central part of the novelty regarding PA and 
the wider algorithmic world we can see taking shape around us is the apparently limitless 
scope for data analysis and data grabbing to occur: so long as there is life, action, and a flow 
of materials, there are opportunities for firms in the data analytics sector to put algorithms to 
work; to model and make potentially lucrative markets from the analysis of seemingly 
mundane practices. If (the data producing potential of) today’s 2.5 billion small-scale food 
producers in the global south are now in the viewfinder of the ag-tech sector, their position 
with respect to the dynamics charted in this paper deserves critical attention from scholars in 
the area of peasant and agrarian studies.  
 
5. Conclusion: Towards data sovereignty 
This paper has explored features of an emerging terrain in which robot farmers, self-driving 
tractors, sensors, and tracking devices are proliferating. Fascinating developments regarding 
these variants of so-called precision agriculture are certainly taking place. What these 
developments will yield, in the end, remains far from certain. But there are clear indications 
that the data grab – building on the formation of new products, services, and markets that 
pivot on dispossessing agricultural prosumers – will grow via geographical expansion: by 
targeting sales to distant food producers and enrolling them in data generating processes that 
provide materials to be analyzed and brought to market, potentially also with scope for 
patents to emerge that privatize (conceivably, as-yet-unknown) steps or practices around food 
production. Much of this expansion will occur in the export-oriented sub-sector within the 
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bifurcated rural spaces of the global south. But even the mostly-subsistence, smallholder sub-
sector will come into view. If a ‘land grab’ will continue to unfold in front of us, it is going to 
occur alongside elements of a ‘data grab.’  
 
The challenge now is to contest data grabbing. Per notions of food sovereignty (e.g. see 
Wittman, Desmarais and Wiebe 2010) and related concepts such as ‘seed sovereignty’ 
(Kloppenburg 2010), I would like to conclude by tentatively proposing the need for 
deliberation regarding a concept we might fruitfully refer to as ‘data sovereignty.’ As the 
above materials have indicated, simply connecting to the online world today generates data 
points for firms to crunch, analyze, add value, and sell. If food producers enter into new 
relations with agricultural technology providers (ATPs), they become exposed to the data 
grab, perhaps unwittingly and then with uncertain consequences given the gestational phase 
of this market. Against this backdrop, data sovereignty requires that actors in civil society, or 
in cooperative economic associations develop principles and practices that explore whether 
the emergent value of data should be held in common, rather than privatized; destroyed, 
rather than analyzed and brought to market; or stored nearby, rather than exported.  
 
Crucially, however, and in accordance with Kloppenburg’s (2014) qualification of 
biotechnology and corporate biotechnology, data sovereignty should not mean complete 
rejection of all aspects of PA, simply because there is a flow of data. Technology will live 
with us in the twenty-first century (witness the extraordinary growth and popularity of 
Smartphones over the last few years). But there are (widely-discussed, widely-used) 
alternative software architectures that enable users to sidestep the data grab. Using an open-
source operating system (OS) running variants of Linux, rather than the Apple or Microsoft 
variants, is one step. Using an open-source encrypted email service such as Protonmail is 
another. For cloud storage, users can turn to Boxcryptor, or create their own ‘cloud’ via 
network-attached storage (NAS) systems. For instant messaging, Signal. At issue here is 
adopting a principle that inconvenience – slower speeds, for instance3 – might be a necessary 
step toward refusing the invitation to enrol in data grabbing architectures and related systems 
and practices that marketize social life via near-invisible algorithmic dispossession.  
 
                                                 
3 Like slow food, slow computing has some merit. 
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For food producers in the contemporary period, simply because an element of farming 
practice might generate data is no reason to reject it outright; at issue, instead, is developing 
an understanding of how that data is used, or whether or not users can ‘hack it.’  The 
challenge is to contest or manipulate PA with a view to achieving food sovereignty without 
contributing to the data grab. The objective of data sovereignty is to contest how the 
globalization of technology architectures (around food production or regarding other areas of 
social life) takes shape. There is a need now to imagine, discover, and pursue ways of 
incorporating questions of how we deal with data into the questions we raise about the 
prospects for food sovereignty in the twenty-first century.  
 
Some indications of what might be needed here emanate from actions by farmers in the US. 
The Grower Information Services Cooperative, for example, claims to be the agricultural 
sector’s ‘only grower-run data cooperative (GISC 2017). According to its CEO, Jason Ward, 
GISC is ‘a cooperative [...] We're farmer-owned and we have a high level of trust with our 
members’ (Vogt 2017). GISC has now joined with the Agricultural Data Coalition, which was 
formed by farmers and allies in law, business, engineering, and academic research. Together 
they have established AgXchange which is ‘designed as an open, central point of access’ for 
farm data. It is, they claim, ‘a neutral platform for the grower to control how their data is 
shared’; an initiative ‘dedicated to creating the agriculture industry’s first cloud-based 
platform that will be controlled by growers and open to all industry service partners and 
technology providers’ (AgProExchange 2017). In short, AgXchange is about finding ways of 
stopping the data grab; and reflects the deep concern among some farmers that ATPs will 
grab and use farm data for their own purposes. It is emblematic of actions intended to reuse 
the invitation to enrol in systems and practices that marketize social life via near-invisible 
algorithmic dispossession. Data sovereignty entails developing initiatives along similar lines.4 
At the very least, there is a strong case to be made for food producers and their associations 
in the global north and south examining how initiatives such as AgXchange operate and 
evaluating what they achieve.  
 
Emphatically, however, the overall task of pursuing something along the lines of data 
sovereignty is not going to be straightforward. In the first place, for those assessing or 
                                                 
4 And require supporters of food sovereignty to probe the limits of coalitions with the private sector 
(contractors, consultants, providers of ‘data farms,’ etc.). 
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creating food sovereignty as an answer to many of the most pressing social challenges today 
– hunger, climate change, corporate power – the matter of what happens to data might simply 
seem like a minor issue: even if our lives are bound up with computing, the significance of 
the data we produce can appear to be a marginal dynamic amidst a violent, oppressive world. 
Moreover, although the offer of ‘free’ software services is too good to be true; as an offer it 
is, nevertheless, still a good offer, at least for a great many people. Yet, so long as users of 
contemporary technology services participate and remain dispossessed of the value emerging 
from the data points our daily activities generate, we not only risk new forms of corporate 
control over society5 we also acquiesce – which is, I suggest, a far cry from (any notion of) 
sovereignty.   
 
                                                 
5 The rise of tech giants might hold out the promise that they will not be evil, as Google once 
promised, but their track records suggest otherwise. Besides, shareholder value, growth, profit 
margins are what will always matter, in the final instance. 
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